Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

TOP SECRET

DAD/C1

7 February 1961

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Copy No. C 73

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(b)(3)

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

supervises party affairs in the USSR's largest republic. Compared with some other Soviet republics, the RSFSR had a satisfactory agricultural year in 1960 and there has been no indication of executive failures on Aristov's part. His demotion appears to be the outcome of a competition for authority among Khrushchev's lieutenants. His removal from the RSFSR post, in which he has been replaced by a newcomer to the central command, appears likely both to strengthen the grip of Frol Kozlov, as Khrushchev's principal party aide on the RSFSR party organization and to enhance the position of Dmitry Polyansky, the RSFSR premier. [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

Congo: Britain, France, and Belgium have now expressed reservations concerning Hammarskjold's recent proposals that the Congolese Army be neutralized. The British believe that the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would be undermined if the troops in the Leopoldville area were disarmed. French and Belgian representatives have also stated that the proposal would be

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

(b)(3)

detrimental to Kasavubu's legal position, and might result in the early restoration to power of Lumumba.

(b)(3)

Burma: General Ne Win appears to have staved off a potential challenge to his control of the Burmese Army. On 3 February, he reportedly accepted the resignation of Brigadier Maung Maung, as well as the resignations of several other senior officers, and ordered five of Burma's 13 brigade commanders to attaché posts abroad. These actions would eliminate those who have argued most strongly for a resumption of military government and against Prime Minister Nu's policy of rapprochement with Peiping.

(b)(3)

Iran: The Shah is reported to be discouraged by election difficulties, problems in Iranian-Soviet relations, and uncertainty over future American policy toward Iran. The fear of resurgent nationalists has led him to impose almost complete control over the current parliamentary elections. This in turn has brought an increase in antiregime activity of nationalist groups. While the Shah has given earlier assurances to the United States that he would not make any significant political concessions to the USSR, he has instructed his prime minister not to be "totally antagonistic" toward the USSR but to find out what the Soviet Union would be willing to do for Iran.

(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055

Congo Situation

A British Foreign Office official has indicated that Britain has some reservations concerning the recent United States initiative in the Congo. The American Embassy in London believes that the British will ask for a further review of the proposals before they are willing to support them. Representatives of the French and Belgian governments have also raised questions concerning the plan.

The British believe that the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would be compromised by a neutralization of the Congolese forces, as the United States plan suggests. Moreover, they question whether Kasavubu will accept the plan and doubt that many UN members would be willing to make the necessary sacrifices to carry it out if it is accepted. They reportedly favor a more gradual approach to the problem, waiting to bring forward the proposals at least until the end of February, when the UN's conciliation commission is scheduled to publish its report. The commission, which is now completing its investigations in the Congo, is expected to make a report generally favorable to Kasavubu and the moderates.

Nehru, in a conversation with the US ambassador in New Delhi, welcomed the new plan and expressed complete agreement with many of its elements. He reiterated, however, his belief that political prisoners, including Lumumba, should be released earlier than new proposals envisage.

Meanwhile, Mobutu appears to be planning a military operation against Gizenga's forces. He stated recently that he had reports of disaffection among Gizenga's troops in eastern Kivu Province and that he was ready to move into the area in the near future. Preparations for the move apparently are being made with the assistance of Mobutu's Belgian military advisers. However, any operation will be hampered by logistics difficulties and by the unreliability of Mobutu's troops. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541055